




Does good governance reduce foodgrain
diversion in PDS?
 24 July, 2016
In 2011-12, various states undertook measures to curb leakages of foodgrains from the
Public Distribution System. Some of the pioneer states also implemented the National
Food Security Act - a rights-based approach to food security - in 2013. Against the
backdrop of these reforms, this column analyses whether there is any marked difference
in the leakage pattern of foodgrains across states.
 
 
The Public Distribution System (PDS) in India, one of the largest food security
programmes operating in South Asia, has been severely criticised for leakage of
foodgrains, causing poor bene ciaries to be deprived of their due.1 The key reasons for
such leakage include lack of awareness among bene ciaries about their entitlement as
well as the the price at which they should be given foodgrains under PDS, and
prevalence of corruption at different levels of the supply chain.
It is, however, heartening to note that foodgrain leakage decreased from 54% in 2004-
05 to 42% in 2011-12 at the national level (Drèze and Khera 2015) (National Sample
Survey (NSS) - 61st and 68th round). Using data from the India Human Development
Survey (IHDS), another nationally representative survey, Desai 2015 arrives at similar
results: she  nds a 10 percentage point decline in the leakage  gure over the same
time period.
Many states such as Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Orissa, Bihar etc.,
started reforms in the PDS from 2004-05 in order to reduce leakages and improve the
performance of the programme. The National Food Security Act (NFSA) was passed in
2013, which is a transition from a welfare approach to a rights-based approach. The
legislation confers a legal right on bene ciaries to obtain entitled quantities of
foodgrains at highly subsidised prices. While 11 states or Union Territories have
already adopted the NFSA or its variants by July 2014, the others are still following the
Targeted Public Distribution System (TPDS).
What happened to foodgrain leakage across states in such a scenario? I attempt to
answer this question by estimating the leakage of foodgrains from the PDS for the
agricultural year 2014-15 (October–January) using primary survey data along with data
collected from secondary sources in six major states - Assam, Bihar, Chhattisgarh,
Karnataka, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal (Paul 2015). Of these, Chhattisgarh,
Karnataka and Bihar had already switched to the NFSA during the period of the survey,
while Assam, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal were operating under TPDS.
Estimation of leakage
Broadly there were three ration card categories under TPDS (or, in the non-NFSA
states): APL (Above Poverty Line), BPL (Below Poverty Line), and AAY (Antyodaya Anna
Yojana) that is the poorest of the poor section of the society. The APL allocation was
abolished under the NFSA. The two ration card categories under the new regime are
PHH (Priority Households) and AAY.
I used the following algebraic formula to estimate leakage of foodgrains:
List= {(Oist - Pist) / Oist } * 100 ------------------- (1)
where,
List = Leakage in state 's' for i
th category of ration card holders in year 't'
Oist= Offtake from centre's allocation for state 's' and offtake from state's own
allocation of foodgrains (if applicable) for ith category of ration card holders in year 't'
Pist= Total purchase of foodgrains from PDS by i
th category card holders in year 't'
Foodgrain leakages for the card categories of the PHH and AAY households have been
calculated by clubbing them together in the NFSA states since foodgrains are allotted
there on an aggregate for the two groups. On the other hand, for the states operating
under TPDS, leakages have been estimated separately2 for the APL, BPL and AAY
ration card categories as foodgrains are allocated for these groups separately.
Variation in foodgrain leakage across states
The average  gures of leakage at the state level across the TPDS and NFSA states are
presented in Tables 1a and 1b.
Table 1a. Foodgrain leakage in TPDS states (%)




















I  nd that in the states following TPDS, APL allocation is the major source of leakage
(see Table 1a), as has been rightly pointed out in related PDS literature (Drèze and
Khera 2015). Field visits revealed that many of the ration card holders in this category
do not purchase foodgrains from the PDS because of their poor quality. The Fair Price
Shop (FPS) dealers thereafter sell such unsold stock in the open market at much
higher prices as compared to the PDS price. The diversion of foodgrain from the BPL
quota ranges from 28% in West Bengal to 37% in Assam, though it is comparatively
lower for the AAY category. In parts of Uttar Pradesh, the poor bene ciaries belonging
to the BPL and AAY categories shared their various grievances, one among which was
the complaint that, on an average, they receive only 33 kg of rice and wheat instead of
the allotted quota of 35 kg.
The situation is somewhat better in states that have implemented the NFSA (see Table
1b). The magnitude of leakage is the least in Chhattisgarh among the six states covered
under the study, and it remained the best performing state for PDS. The secret of its
success is the creation of an ef cient delivery mechanism along with the spread of
high awareness among bene ciaries about their PDS entitlement.
Bihar has become a successful revival state with a moderate leakage  gure. The state
went through a major revamp in the functioning of the PDS after it introduced the
coupon-based distribution method in 20073 to curb corruption. Drèze, Khera and
Pudussery (2015) argue that the advent of the NFSA in 2013 may also have brought
about a signi cant positive change. However, the state still has a long way to go to
achieve total success in its food security programme. Our  eld teams received
complaints of siphoning off of foodgrains, distribution of foodgrain at the less than full
entitlement levels, and rude behaviour of FPS dealers.
Karnataka - one of the better performing states in the PDS has adopted several
reforms, though the magnitude of leakage is higher as compared to the other two
states that have implemented the NFSA. The installation of electronic weighing
machines on a pilot basis and the linking of ration card records with biometric
information of the members of bene ciary households are noteworthy. These
machines were not fully functional till the end of 2014 as the state was struggling with
major power supply disruptions, lack of an ef cient power back-up system, as well as
other technical glitches. Another key concern in Karnataka was the over reporting of
the size of families so that they enjoy higher PDS allocation than their actual
entitlement. (The state used to allocate foodgrains on the basis of the number of
family members in a household, instead of treating one household as a single unit).
Karnataka had to eventually revise the allocation as per the NFSA norms.
Improving PDS functioning
Improving the overall functioning of the PDS entails the introduction of several
measures including strengthening the monitoring mechanism, revamping the existing
grievance redressal system, and making the vigilance committees functional at the
grassroots level. The replacement of conventional machines for weighing foodgrains
with electronic ones would also ensure accurate distribution of foodgrains. Leakages
can be reduced further at the state level by enhancing awareness among bene ciaries
about their entitlement and the correct PDS prices of foodgrains. It may thus be
concluded that despite the absence of a clear causal relationship between the
implementation of the NFSA and reduced leakages of foodgrains due to data
constraints, we could still argue that foodgrain leakages under the PDS could be
signi cantly curtailed by combining the implementation of NFSA with good
governance at the state level.
Notes:
Further Reading
The leakage or diversion of foodgrains is de ned as the proportion of foodgrains
not reaching the bene ciary households under the programme.
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year. Every month they redeem one coupon against each of the speci ed PDS
commodity at a local FSP. Coupons can be collected at village camps organised by
local gram panchayats. However, coupons were not used for distribution under the
PDS during our survey period because of administrative reasons.
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